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Written largely by and adopted at the insistence of the U.S-
led Allied Occupation of Japan in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, the Japanese Constitution of 1947 (“1947 Constitution”) 
represents a unique contribution to U.S. geostrategic 
constitutionalism.  At its core, the document is an explicit extension 
of the geostrategic vision espoused by Washington in 1796, a vision 
to protect the nation and its vital interests from the devastation 
inherent to militarism and war.  U.S. legal scholars have thus far 
overlooked the 1947 Constitution as part and parcel of America’s 
constitutional heritage.  This Note seeks to rectify this shortcoming 
in the literature and preliminarily situate the 1947 Constitution in a 
U.S constitutional context.  
However, in seeking to so place the 1947 Constitution, the 
issue of the document’s legitimacy as Japan’s “higher law”—a 
recurring feature of Japanese domestic politics—comes into sharp 
relief.  The substantial American contribution to the development of 
the 1947 Constitution has perpetuated an impression that the 
document was unilaterally imposed on the Japanese nation.  Yet such 
a view of U.S.-imposed constitutionalism on Japan is ultimately 
simplistic and superficial, and undervalues the considerable 
Japanese interests represented in the 1947 Constitution itself and the 
process by which it was designed.  This Note builds on the significant 
body of scholarship that has attacked the imposition perspective, but 
rather than looking toward popular acceptance — as previous 
scholarship has done — this Note considers the role of Japanese 
geostrategic considerations in the 1947 Constitution’s drafting and 
ratification process. 
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In his 1796 Farewell Address to his young nation, George 
Washington devoted significant time towards elaborating on the 
geostrategic genius of America’s new constitution.  “[E]very part of 
our country,” exulted Washington, “thus feels an immediate and 
particular interest in union.”  He went on: 
 
[A]ll the parts combined cannot fail to find in the 
united mass of means and efforts greater strength, 
greater resource, proportionably greater security from 
external danger, a less frequent interruption of their 
peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable 
value, they must derive from union an exemption from 
those broils and wars between themselves, which so 
frequently afflict neighboring countries not tied 
together by the same governments.1  
 
From Washington’s perspective, the formation of a political unum 
from a fragmented pluribus offered manifold benefits for the new 
North American polity: the united strength of the states would deter 
unwanted militarism both by foreign national powers and the states 
themselves.  
Throughout the course of American constitutional 
development, from the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia to 
the current Obama Administration, this geostrategic vision of the U.S. 
Constitution of 1789 has received regular explanation and expansion, 
                                                                                                               
1 George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/washing.asp. 
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and the concept of geostrategic constitutionalism—the influence of 
national security considerations on the development of a 
constitutional state—has firmly established itself within America’s 
constitutional canon.2  In fact, as far as the purpose of a constitution 
is to structure a polity and provide for the structure’s preservation in 
perpetuity, geostrategic constitutionalism can be understood as the 
foundation upon which any constitutional state is necessarily 
constituted.  Yet one crucial subject remains noticeably absent from 
the academic literature on U.S. geostrategic constitutionalism:  the 
Japanese Constitution of 1947 (“1947 Constitution”). 
Written largely by and adopted at the insistence of the U.S-
led Allied Occupation of Japan in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, the 1947 Constitution represents a unique contribution to U.S. 
geostrategic constitutionalism.  At its core, the document is an 
explicit extension of the geostrategic vision espoused by Washington 
in 1796, a vision to protect the nation and its vital interests from the 
devastation inherent to militarism and war.  U.S. legal scholars have 
thus far overlooked the 1947 Constitution—and in particular, its 
Renunciation of War Clause—as part and parcel of America’s 
constitutional heritage.  This Note seeks to rectify this shortcoming 
in the literature and preliminarily situate the 1947 Constitution in a 
U.S. constitutional context.  
However, in seeking to so place the 1947 Constitution, the 
issue of the document’s legitimacy as Japan’s “higher law”—a 
recurring feature of Japanese domestic politics—comes into sharp 
relief.  The substantial American contribution to the development of 
the 1947 Constitution has perpetuated an impression that the 
document was unilaterally imposed on the Japanese nation.3  Among 
contemporary U.S. legal scholars, Noah Feldman has been a 
prominent proponent of such a view, reflecting nostalgically that 
“Gone are the days when American legal officers could write the 
constitution of Japan, translate it into Japanese, and extract the 
acquiescence of such a Japanese government as existed under the 
auspices of U.S. occupation and the reign of Supreme Allied 
                                                                                                               
2 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005) 
(discussing the Framers’ intent to unite the colonial landmass and establish a union). 
3 It is commonly held that Japan presents the “classic,” and most successful, example 
of an imposed constitution that the world saw in the twentieth century.  David S. Law, The 
Myth of the Imposed Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS 239, 240 (Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).  
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Commander General Douglas MacArthur.” 4   Across the Pacific, 
numerous Japanese scholars, politicians, and members of the public 
likewise espouse the viewpoint that the 1947 Constitution was a 
foreign imposition on a weak post-war Japan.  In particular, Japanese 
conservatives frequently promote this version of historical events in 
the hopes of undermining the 1947’s Constitution’s governing 
legitimacy and the historically substantial public support for its 
Renunciation of War Clause, which operates in law—though perhaps 
not in practice—to limit Japan’s military capabilities.5  
Yet this story of a U.S.-imposed constitutionalism on Japan is 
ultimately simplistic and superficial, and undervalues the 
considerable Japanese interests represented in the 1947 Constitution 
itself and the process by which it was designed.  The 1947 
Constitution represented nothing short of a geostrategic victory for 
the Japanese nation in the aftermath of loss in a devastating global 
conflict.  At the time of its creation, Japan had unconditionally 
surrendered to the Allied Powers, and was both legally and militarily 
at their mercy.  Between the fall of 1945 and the promulgation of the 
1947 Constitution on November 3, 1946, the Japanese maneuvered 
within the confines of Occupation demands—sometimes choosing to 
acquiesce, other times successfully exerting their own preferences—
to develop a constitution that satisfied political forces on both sides 
of the Pacific.  What emerged from the give-and-take was a nothing 
short of a constitution for a new Japan.  Therefore, while seeking to 
place the 1947 Constitution in U.S. constitutional context, this Note 
simultaneously seeks to place it in its Japanese constitutional context 
and challenge the accusation that it was simply foisted on a weak 
Japan. 
As such, this Note builds on the significant body of 
                                                                                                               
4 Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 857 (2005).  John 
Dower has observed, “No modern nation ever has rested on a more alien constitution.”  JOHN 
W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 347 (1999). 
5  Law, supra note 3, at 240.  The post-1947 interpretation and application of the 
Renunciation of War Clause (Article 9) is beyond the scope of this Note.  For more 
information on Article 9 and the development of the contemporary Japanese national security 
apparatus, see Karen Piotrowski, Keeping Pace with the Progress of the World: Article 9 of 
the Japanese Constitution, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 1653 (2005).  In the wake of terrorist attacks 
on Japanese citizens, current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated in favor of 
formally amending Article 9.  Martin Fackler, Abe Is Said to Have Plans to Revise Pacifist 
Charter, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/world/asia/abe-
wants-to-revise-pacifist-constitution-as-early-as-2016-ally-says.html. 
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scholarship that has attacked the imposition perspective.  While 
scholars critical of the imposition interpretation of the 1947 
Constitution’s history have largely written from the vantage point of 
popular acceptance—arguing, for example, that the public’s support 
for the new constitution endowed the document with governing 
legitimacy, despite perceived opposition from Japanese political 
elites6—this Note takes an alternative approach and considers the role 
of Japanese geostrategic considerations in the 1947 Constitution’s 
drafting and ratification process.   
In other words, this Note seeks to accomplish two overarching 
goals: 1) to understand the 1947 Constitution within the dual 
frameworks of both U.S. and Japanese geostrategic constitutionalism; 
and 2) to examine how viewing the 1947 Constitution through the 
lens of Japanese geostrategic constitutionalism undermines the 
assessment of the document as an imposed and foreign constitution.  
The Note begins with a brief examination of both U.S. and 
Japanese geostrategic constitutionalism prior to the Second World 
War, and shows how the two nations’ respective constitutions and 
constitutional developments embodied national security interests.  
The Note then turns toward 1945, and assesses the exertion of 
geostrategic considerations by both the U.S. and Japan at the 
conclusion of the Second World War. 
Next, the Note scrutinizes the process of drafting and ratifying 
the 1947 Constitution, and argues that the document can be properly 
understood through the dual frameworks of U.S. and Japanese 
geostrategic constitutionalism.  In the process, the Note challenges 
the view of the 1947 Constitution as imposed on Japan by showing 
how U.S. and Japanese actors and interests collaboratively exercised 
agency and influence over the creation of the post-war constitution. 
Finally, the Note concludes with a few observations on the 
1947 Constitution, and the continuing influence of U.S. and Japanese 
geostrategic constitutionalism in contemporary times. 
                                                                                                               
6 See, e.g., Law, supra note 3, at 240 (discussing the popular support for the Japanese 
Constitution and the Japanese conservatives’ strategic argument that the Constitution was 
imposed).  Law challenges the view of the 1947 Constitution as an imposed constitution by 
challenging 1) the conflation of the preferences of the Japanese leadership of the time with 
the preferences of the Japanese people and 2) the minimization of popular opinion on the 
constitution-making process.  In short, Law argues that public support for the 1947 
Constitution shielded it at the time of its promulgation and has continued to do so throughout 
the decades, providing an explanation for its considerable longevity despite calls by 
conservative politicians to amend or overturn it.  Id. at 241, 252-53. 
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I. PUBLIUS’ GEOSTRATEGIC VISION: THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 1789 & U.S. GEOSTRATEGIC 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
By 1787, the Articles of Confederation—which had formally 
bound the thirteen colonies-then-states of the New World together 
since their revolution against Great Britain—was failing in majestic 
fashion.  States showed little respect for even the limited power that 
the national government could legally exercise and likewise showed 
little respect for each other, threatening their individual and collective 
internal stability and external security.7   It was in this precarious 
context that the 1787 Philadelphia Convention was convened.  
Attended by some of the most prominent statesmen of the era—
George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, James Wilson, Alexander 
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, among others—the 
Convention led to the creation and adoption in 1789 of the 
Constitution of the United States.  
For many of its Framers, the Constitution of 1789 concerned 
the “fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the 
world.”8  But what did this constitution actually accomplish, and why 
did these illustrious men view the document’s enactment as vital to 
the survival of their New World polity?   
In their series of essays in support of ratification of the 
Philadelphia Plan, Hamilton, Jay, and Madison—writing jointly 
under the name “Publius”—argued that in order to realize the true 
benefits of perpetual union, the thirteen separate states would need to 
merge into one indivisible nation.  Such a united polity in the New 
World, argued Publius, could mirror Britain’s unique security as a 
united island nation, fortified against hostile forces both at home and 
abroad.  As Akhil Amar has observed, “[b]y creating an ‘insular’ 
condition in America, the proposed Constitution would guarantee 
Americans the rights of Englishmen, and more, by replicating—
indeed, surpassing—the geostrategic niche of Englishmen.”9  
Publius preached the positive geostrategic implications of 
perpetual union from both an internal and external perspective.  In 
                                                                                                               
7 See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Collapse of the Articles of Confederation, in THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 225–45 (J. Jackson 
Barlow et al., eds., 1988).  
8 THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
9 AMAR, supra note 2, at 44. 
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critiquing the internal situation faced by the several states, Publius 
observed that the history of continental Europe presented a miserable 
history “. . . of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; 
of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little 
acquisition.”10  In Europe, argued Publius, regimes required well-
equipped and well-manned armies to defend their land borders 
against invasion by their neighbors. 11   Because “most other 
BORDERING nations [are] always . . . either involved in disputes 
and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them,” a single state 
bent on military adventurism could compel nearby states to build up 
their armed capabilities as a means to deter and repel invasion, 
leading in short time to the establishment “. . . in every part of this 
country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge 
of the Old World.”12  Armies could be and often did find themselves 
wielded not only to impede would-be invaders, but also to quash 
individual liberty and collective self-government.13  To Publius, the 
North American states needed to take sweeping action to avoid the 
unfortunate fate of continental Europe by emulating the 1707 union 
of Scotland and England: they must permanently unify their New 
World landmass and be “. . . bound together in a strict and 
indissoluble Union . . . superior to the control of all transatlantic force 
or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between 
the old and the new world!”14   
Examining the states’ external position, Publius argued that 
the “firm league of friendship” established by the Articles of 
Confederation was ill-equipped to fulfill its fundamental purpose of 
securing “. . . [the states’] common defense, the security of their 
liberties, and their mutual and general welfare” against “all force 
offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them” by 
                                                                                                               
10 THE FEDERALIST No. 8 (Alexander Hamilton). 
11 Id. (“The nations of Europe are encircled with chains of fortified places, which 
mutually obstruct invasion.”). 
12 THE FEDERALIST No. 5 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 10. 
13 AMAR, supra note 2, at 45.  The Framers distinguished between armies and navies, 
the latter being viewed as less threatening to liberty compared to the former.  In fact, navies 
were widely viewed as the protectors of liberty.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James 
Madison) (“The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on our safety, are 
happily such as can never be turned by a perfidious government against our liberties.”). 
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander Hamilton).  See also THE FEDERALIST No. 5, 
supra note 12.  (“If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an 
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation.”). 
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antagonistic powers.15  To perpetuate the Articles and its weak form 
of national government would be to extend an invitation to European 
military adventurism in North America, and leave the young nation 
unable to adequately respond. 16   From Publius’ perspective, 
Americans must discourage the monarchies of Europe from seeking 
to reinforce their New World presence.  Compared to the loose 
alliance under the Articles, a truly “United States” would be more 
capable of turning back European adventurism.17  The Atlantic Ocean 
would be pacific in essence; in Amar’s words, “an English Channel 
times fifty, a vast moat that would protect America against . . . the 
militarism of the European continental powers.”18 
While Publius’ geostrategic vision primarily viewed the 
Constitution of 1789 as a means to quell the dangers that would 
accompany disunion, both internal and external, it also included a 
practical economic component: bringing the thirteen states together 
                                                                                                               
15 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. III, para. 1; Federalist No. 15 (Hamilton) 
(“[T]he concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite, under the Confederation, 
to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union . . . The 
measures of the Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have, step by 
step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at length, arrested all the wheels of the 
national government, and brought them to an awful stand.”). 
16 See THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay) (“[W]hatever may be our situation, whether 
firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of confederacies, certain 
it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us 
accordingly.  If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our 
trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and 
finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, 
they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.  If, 
on the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government . . . or split into 
three or four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies . . . what a poor, 
pitiful figure will America make in their eyes!”).  In the words of another leading Federalist, 
James Wilson, “Such number of separate states, contiguous in situation, unconnected and 
disunited in government, would be, at one time, the prey of foreign force, foreign influence, 
and foreign intrigue.”  1 FRANK MOORE, AMERICAN ELOQUENCE: A COLLECTION OF 
SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES: BY THE MOST EMINENT ORATORS OF AMERICA 78 (1st ed. 1880).  
Likewise, during the Constitutional Convention, James Randolph observed that the 
confederation provided no security against foreign invasion, as the congress lacked the 
means to prevent or even wage war.  1 1787: DRAFTING OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 85, 87–
88 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 1st ed. 1986) (“If force [is necessary to meet force], this force 
must be drawn from the States, and the States may or may not furnish it.”). 
17 AMAR, supra note 2, at 47.  
18 Id. at 46.  See also THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 10 (“If we are wise enough to 
preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated 
situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to 
continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. 
Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss3/3
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under a single “continental canopy” would save on the total amount 
of money needed for military defense and other core governmental 
functions, as well as more effectively distribute financial resources in 
times of national exigency.19  Moreover, the creation of a united front 
against European powers would simultaneously produce a 
“demilitarized interstate free-trade zone,” permitting increased 
business dealings between Americans themselves. 20   Free intra-
American trade would also encourage a domestic shipping industry; 
America would become a “nursery of seamen,” and these seamen 
could then be converted into an American navy in times of crisis.21 
While this geostrategic vision of the Constitution of 1789 
informed much of its textualized structure and substance,22 a written 
                                                                                                               
19 AMAR, supra note 2, at 48; THE FEDERALIST No. 13 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The 
money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there will be so much 
the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people.  If the States are united under one 
government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several 
confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided for—and 
each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be 
necessary for a government of the whole.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 4, supra note 16 (“One 
government can . . . apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any 
particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate 
confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system.”). 
20  AMAR, supra note 2, at 47.  In particular, the economic implications of North 
American geography seemed well suited to national coordination and oversight.  In a speech 
to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, James Wilson observed, “The extent of 
territory, the diversity of climate and soil, the number, and greatness, and connection of lakes 
and rivers, with which the United States are intersected and almost surrounded, all indicate 
an enlarged government to be fit and advantageous for them.”  2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
BY THE STATES: PENNSYLVANIA 358 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
21 AMAR, supra note 2, at 48.  See also THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 13 (“It must, 
indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, that as her Union will be the 
only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against 
danger from abroad.  In this respect our situation bears another likeness to the insular 
advantage of Great Britain.”). 
22  For example, compare the enumerated goals for union in ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III (“. . . for their common defense, the security of their 
liberties, and their mutual and general welfare . . .”) with U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“. . . to form a 
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common 
defence [sic], promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity . . .”), with the latter adding the goal of internal security, as well as the 
actions verbs “provide,” “promote,” and “secure.”  Moreover, geostrategic considerations 
influenced the Constitution’s ban on standing appropriations for armies (but not navies) in 
Article I, section 8; its rules about state troops in Article I, section 10; its protections of the 
militia in both Article I and the Second Amendment; its distrust towards “soldiers” (but not 
“sailors,” mirroring Article 1, section 8) in the Third Amendment; its civilian leadership of 
the military in Article II; its provisions for the admission of new states (contemplation of the 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
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constitution is ultimately just a few words on a piece of paper.23  
Constitution-making—or the operationalization of a constitutional 
text from written word to acted deed—involves interpretation, 
explanation, and action over many years by many people, with 
sustained consideration for the document’s architecture and 
purpose.24  This process of operationalizing the Constitution of 1789 
and its geostrategic vision began under the Washington 
Administration, and subsequent presidents, other political and 
military leaders, and the American public itself,25 have continued the 
process in earnest.26  
In what was perhaps the most refined and stirring articulation 
of the Constitution’s geostrategic vision since Washington’s Farewell 
Address, Abraham Lincoln opined in his First Inaugural Address in 
1861, “[p]hysically speaking, we cannot separate.  We cannot remove 
our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall 
between them . . . . Is it possible then to make that intercourse more 
advantageous, or more satisfactory, after separation than before?  Can 
aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws?” 27   Like 
Publius, Lincoln worried about generating an arms race or trade war 
                                                                                                               
religiously-influenced political belief that would become known popularly as “Manifest 
Destiny”) in Article IV; its guarantee of each state’s boundaries against invasion and each 
state’s democratic republic against military tyranny in Article IV; and its language describing 
the Constitution as the law of “the Land” (again contemplating Manifest Destiny) in Article 
VI.  AMAR, supra note 2, at 51. 
23 Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
483, 485 (1991). 
24 Id. at 485. 
25  While this Note focuses on constitution-making by high-level U.S. government 
actors, popular participation in America’s constitutional project serves as a foundation on 
which these elites act.  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism and Political 
Organization, 18 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013) (delineating the normative and 
descriptive strands of popular constitutionalism, focusing on the descriptive strand and how 
popular views include social movements and political parties).  
26 A few early examples include the Louisiana Purchase, and the developments of the 
Monroe Doctrine and the nationalist concept of Manifest Destiny.  AMAR, supra note 2, at 
49. 
27  Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp; Abraham Lincoln, Second State of the Union (Dec. 1, 
1862), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29503.  The Civil War also offers a unique 
intra-American case study of what Noah Feldman terms “imposed constitutionalism”: the 
post-war Reconstruction, during which Union Army-occupied southern states were denied 
representation in Congress until they ratified the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Feldman, supra note 4, at 859.  These two amendments—the Fourteenth, in particular—
restructured the balance of power between the federal government and the states and in effect 
imposed a new nationally-oriented constitutional order. 
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between two neighboring national powers—in his time, the United 
States and the Confederate States of America—a situation that had 
the potential to lead to the permanent militarization and 
impoverishment of the North American continent.28  As Lincoln saw 
it, Americans who disliked the Union were themselves free to leave 
it, but they could not take the land with them, or impose secession on 
other Americans.  Such a right would undermine—even render 
moot—the valuable geostrategic dividends carefully crafted by the 
Constitution of 1789. 
Since Lincoln confronted a nation at war with itself, 
Americans have continued to benefit from U.S. geostrategic 
constitutionalism.  During the Second World War, for example, 
although Europe and Asia suffered colossal damage and death, 
America’s wide oceanic “moats” kept the continental U.S. safe from 
harm.29  However, waters alone would not guarantee American safety 
in perpetuity.  U.S. geostrategic constitutionalism would need to keep 
pace with a changing global national security landscape, and adopt 
new strategies for protecting the American people and indeed the 
world.30 
 
II. THE WEST COMES TO JAPAN: THE MEIJI 
CONSTITUTION OF 1889 AND JAPANESE GEOSTRATEGIC 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
In 1853, less than a decade before Lincoln would engage in 
geostrategic constitutionalism with the advent of the Civil War, 
another American brought U.S. geostrategic constitutionalism across 
the Pacific—to Japan.  At the command of U.S. President Millard 
Fillmore, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry appeared in the 
waters off the Japanese coast and demanded that Japan end the policy 
of national seclusion that had characterized its approach to the outside 
world for centuries.31  The following year, Perry and the Japanese 
                                                                                                               
28 AMAR, supra note 2, at 52. 
29 Id. at 52.  During the Second World War, only Pearl Harbor in Hawai’i and certain 
parts of Alaska came under serious attack.  The continental U.S. remained unscathed and far 
removed from the devastation that the war wrought throughout Europe and Asia. 
30 The evolving nature of national security and warfare, and its implications for U.S. 
geostrategic constitutionalism and U.S. constitutional development more generally, is 
beyond the scope of this Essay. 
31  LAWRENCE W. BEER & JOHN M. MAKI, FROM IMPERIAL MYTH TO DEMOCRACY: 
JAPAN’S TWO CONSTITUTIONS, 1889–2002 8 (2002). 
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leadership formally concluded the Treaty of Kanagawa, which 
effectively ended the nation’s isolation from the Western world; 
within a few years, a number of European nations followed suit with 
similar treaties of their own.32  Taken together, these treaties gave 
Western nations a slew of legal and economic rights to conduct 
business in Japan, while declining to provide Japan with reciprocal 
benefits in return.33 
The creation of these one-sided treaties at the urging of 
Western powers precipitated the collapse of Tokugawa rule over 
Japan in 1868, ending its period of political domination lasting since 
approximately 1603.34  Political power was returned to the Japanese 
Emperor, but he struggled to maintain Japanese independence in the 
face of Western pressure to open itself to foreign economic 
interests.35  To discourage Western imperialism, Japan undertook a 
program of rapid Westernization of its legal and political systems, a 
Western power precondition to renegotiating the earlier treaties 
signed in the wake of Commodore Perry’s first visit.36  
However, while external pressure supplied the motivation for 
domestic legal and political reorganization, Japan’s reform process 
was not haphazard or without due regard for Japan’s social and 
political legacy.  In choosing to adopt a Western-style civil code in 
the mold of the French legal system over an U.S.-style common law 
regime, for example, Japanese leaders consciously considered the 
appropriateness of a civil code in light of Japan’s historical familiarity 
with authoritarian forms of government administration, the 
Confucian tendency to respect government authority, and the 
                                                                                                               
32 Id.  See also The Treaty of Kanagawa: Setting the Stage for Japanese-American 
Relations, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured
_documents/treaty_of_kanagawa; Treaty of Kanagawa, Japan-U.S., March 31, 1845, 11 Stat. 
597. 
33 BEER & MAKI, supra note 31, at 8.  Most prominently, the treaties provided Western 
nations with a combination of port access, fishing rights, and trade privileges.  “The Treaty 
of Kanagawa,” supra note 32. 
34 Id.; Percy R. Luney, Jr., Introduction, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW viii (Percy 
R. Luney, Jr., and Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
35 Id. at ix. 
36 Id.  During this formative period, Japan abolished feudalism and its longstanding 
four-class system, including its warrior class that had ruled Japan for seven centuries; created 
a centralized bureaucratic government; established a national army and navy; and created 
national legal and judicial systems.  Moreover, Japan underwent significant economic and 
social change, including the introduction of Western science, the beginnings of a national 
railway system and a merchant marine, the development of print media, and the start of 
integration into global trade.  BEER & MAKI, supra note 31, at 15. 
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hierarchical nature of Japanese society.37  Such considerations also 
actively informed and influenced the development of the Meiji 
Constitution. 
By the late nineteenth century, Japan was ripe for a Western-
style written constitution.  On October 12, 1881, the Emperor issued 
a rescript ordering that a national legislature form by 1890.38  While 
the creation of a constitution went unmentioned, such a legislature 
was without precedent in Japanese history. 39   If such a political 
institution were to be established, the foundation of a constitution 
would be required.40  However, a constitution was also needed for 
even more compelling governance and national security reasons.  The 
complexity of the emerging nation-state, and the importance of order 
and stability to its successful operation, would benefit from a codified 
government structure.41  Most crucially for the Japanese leadership at 
the time, a written constitution would signal to the Western world that 
Japan was becoming a modern nation-state and deserved to be treated 
on an equal footing with Western powers.42   Japanese leadership 
viewed the constitutional project as a means to assert Japanese 
national power against foreign intrusion, much as Hamilton, Madison, 
and Jay viewed their own constitutional project in 1780s North 
America.  Just as the Framers of the U.S. Constitution of 1789 utilized 
a constitutionalized national governing structure as a device to 
withstand foreign militarism, so too would the drafters of the Meiji 
Constitution.  Both sought to show the international powers of their 
day that their respective nations were capable of being—indeed, 
required treatment as—player of equal stature on the international 




                                                                                                               
37  Luney, supra note 34, at ix.  The French-inspired code was adopted in 1890.  
However, in 1896, Japanese leaders replaced the French-inspired civil code with a German-
inspired code, which remains in effect to this day.  See MINPŌ (民法) [CIV. C.] 1896 (Japan).  
Moreover, Japan’s Criminal Code of 1907 is similarly modeled after German law.  Andreas 
Schloenhardt, Mission Unaccomplished: Japan’s Anti-Bôryoku-Ban Law, 28 J. JAPANESE L. 
123, 128 (2010).  
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On February 11, 1889, Japan’s Meiji Emperor revealed 
Japan’s first constitution to his country and the world.43  The Meiji 
Constitution was patterned after the monarchical Prussian 
Constitution of 1850, which—with its recognition of imperial 
sovereignty—fit well into Japanese tradition.44  In essence, the Meiji 
Constitution established an absolutist form of monarchy.  This 
absolutist feature of imperial sovereignty came to override some of 
the Meiji Constitution’s more democratic features45 and provided a 
foundation for the rise of the authoritarian militarism that would rule 
over Japan from the 1930 until the end of the Second World War.46 
It was then that U.S. and Japanese geostrategic constitutionalism 
would collide with Japanese defeat, U.S. military occupation, and the 
creation of the 1947 Constitution. 
 
III. GEOSTRATEGIC CONSTITUTIONALISM, ARTICLE 9, 
AND CREATION OF THE 1947 CONSTITUTION 
 
A. The Potsdam Declaration and Allied Occupation Policy 
 
Written and ratified during the Allied Occupation of Japan 
following the Second World War, the Japanese Constitution of 1947 
                                                                                                               
43 Id. at 17. 
44 DAI NIPPON TEIKOKU KENPŌ (大日本帝国憲法) [CONSTITUTION], Nov. 29, 1890, 
pmbl. (Japan) (hereinafter MEIJI CONSTITUTION) (“These Laws come to only an exposition 
of grand precepts for the conduct of the government, bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of 
Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors”); Id. at art. 1 (“The Empire of Japan shall 
be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”); Id. at art. 4 
(“The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, 
and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution”); Luney, supra 
note 34, at ix.  While the Prussian Constitution served as a model for the Japanese drafters 
of the Meiji Constitution, the drafters by no means copied the Prussian Constitution in 
wholesale fashion.  The drafters adapted their constitution to fit Japan’s needs, at least as 
they viewed them.  For example, the Meiji Constitution went even farther than the Prussian 
Constitution by declaring sovereignty as residing in a divine Emperor who provided the 
constitution to his subjects as a generous gift.  Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the 
Constitution and Its Various Influences: Japanese, American, and European, in JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 3-4 (Percy R. Luney, Jr., & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
45 For example, the Meiji Constitution established the Imperial Diet as the national 
legislature consisting of two Houses, an upper House of Peers and a lower House of 
Representatives.  While the House of Peers would be composed of the members of the 
Imperial Family, nobility, and other persons nominated by the Emperor, the people would 
elect members of the House of Representatives.  MEIJI CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at art. 
33, para. 1; Id. at art. 35, para. 1. 
46 BEER & MAKI, supra note 31, at 21.   
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represented a logical extension of American geostrategic 
constitutionalism, a means to secure the freedom-promoting benefits 
of peace across the aptly named Pacific Ocean.  One particularly 
noteworthy feature of the 1947 Constitution aimed to secure this 
peace—and the liberty that flourished under it—in perpetuity.  This 
feature arose out of victory in war and subsequent military occupation 
calling for a complete disarmament of the Japanese state.47  This 
feature was pacifism, and it was textually embodied in Article 9 of 
the 1947 Constitution. 
When the U.S. military occupied Japan in the fall of 1945, its 
leadership came with a mandate to fundamentally transform the Meiji 
Constitution, which was viewed as a cause-in-fact of Japan’s 
militaristic adventurism both prior to and during the Second World 
War.48  An inability of civilian government to organize itself under 
the pre-war constitution without military support, coupled with a 
series of assassinations organized by military groups and a perpetual 
war in China, had led to the downfall and dissolution of Japanese 
civilian government in the 1930s and the formation of a military-
controlled central administration.49  From then until the end of the 
Second World War, military rule and an ideology rooted in militarism 
would dominate Japan.50  
In addition to seeking to create a “rule of law” society 
paralleling the U.S.—there was an overriding belief among U.S. 
policymakers that Japan should adopt a political system based on the 
American democratic ideals—the Occupation forces intended to fully 
excise military influence from the Japanese body politic.51  In fact, 
the former goals were widely viewed as a necessary predicate to the 
latter: a democratic political society, it was believed, would serve as 
a bulwark against future militarism.52   
The Occupation viewed Japan as nothing short of a 
militaristic state dangerous to world peace, and as such, the 
                                                                                                               
47  John M. Maki, The Constitution of Japan: Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and 
Fundamental Human Rights, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40, 40 (Percy R. Luney, Jr., 
& Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
48 CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 41, 266 
(3d ed. 2012). 
49 Id. at 266. 
50 Id. at 266. 
51 Id. at 40. 
52  Id. at 41; THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 132 (2000). 
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eradication of Japanese militarism and complete demilitarization of 
Japan formed one of the dominant aims of Occupation policy.53  From 
the personal perspective of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur—head 
of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), which was 
responsible for overseeing and administering the Occupation—Japan 
should become the “Switzerland of the Far East” and remain neutral 
in all future wars.54   
The Japanese had forewarning that Occupation policy would 
emphasize pacifism.  The terms of surrender articulated in the 
Potsdam Declaration, accepted by the Emperor on behalf of the 
Japanese nation on August 15, 1945,55 included the destruction of 
Japan’s war-making power and the complete disarmament of its 
military forces.56  The Declaration also provided that “[t]he Japanese 
government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and 
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people,” 
which, as previously discussed, was viewed by the Americans as 
adding an additional check on Japan military promiscuity.57  The 
Japanese signatories understood the Occupation conditions and in 
essence consented to them.58 
 
                                                                                                               
53 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 266.  The “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy 
for Japan,” approved by President Truman on September 6, 1945, listed “complete 
disarmament and demilitarization” among the principal means to achieve the Occupation’s 
objectives, together with “the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which 
will . . . support the objectives of the United States.”  PETER J. HERZOG, JAPAN’S PSEUDO-
DEMOCRACY 218 (1993). 
54 HERZOG, supra note 53, at 218.  The name “Supreme Commander of Allied Powers” 
referred to both MacArthur’s title and the Allied Occupation offices under his supervision. 
55 Japan’s formal Instrument of Surrender was signed between the Japanese government 
and the Allied Powers at Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945.  The Instrument provided for 
“the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General 
Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control 
wherever situated.”  INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER (Japan 1945), http://www.ndl.go.jp/
constitution/e/etc/c05.html.  
56 POTSDAM DECLARATION (Japan 1945), http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.
html.  See also HERZOG, supra note 53, at 218; TETSUYA KATAOKA, THE PRICE OF A 
CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR POLITICS 17 (1991). 
57 POTSDAM DECLARATION, supra note 56; MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 176. 
58  INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER, supra note 55 (“We [the Japanese signers of the 
Instrument of Surrender] hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and 
their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to 
issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the 
purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.”); MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28. 
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With ongoing discussions concerning the fate of Japanese 
military capabilities in the background, on October 4, 1945, General 
MacArthur communicated to the Japanese government that the Meiji 
Constitution still in force would require substantial reform.59  The 
U.S. government and the Allied Powers intended to bring about the 
democratization of the Japanese governmental system, and ordered 
MacArthur to see it done.60  MacArthur repeated the requirement 
directly to Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro one week later, on 
October 11, two days after the formation of his new Cabinet.  With 
MacArthur’s position submitted, a committee under Matsumoto Joji, 
a Minister of State without Portfolio,61 was formed to consider the 
question of constitutional revision.62 
The Matsumoto committee put together two proposals based 
on the principles of the Meiji Constitution: a relatively conservative 
Draft A prepared by Matsumoto personally and a more liberal Draft 
B prepared by the whole committee.63  With respect to armed forces, 
Draft A stated: “The system of armed forces is retained.  The supreme 
command of the armed forces may not be exercised independently, 
except with the advice of the Ministers of State.”64  While Draft B 
deleted the Meiji Constitution’s references to armed forces, it did not 
prohibit the maintenance or use of such forces in the future.65   
On February 1, 1946, Draft A was leaked.66  The draft, which 
continued to place sovereign power in the Emperor, was heavily 
criticized by the SCAP leadership as simply too conservative, and 
MacArthur decided that the “Japanese shilly-shallying [on 
constitutional reform] had gone on long enough.”67  On February 3, 
MacArthur ordered SCAP’s Government Section—headed by 
Brigadier General Courtney Whitney and responsible for 
administrative reform of Japanese governmental systems—to draw 
                                                                                                               
59 James E. Auer, Article Nine: Renunciation of War, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 70 (Percy R. Luney, Jr., & Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
60 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28. 
61 A Minister of State without Portfolio refers to the position whereby the officeholder 
does not have any officially delegated responsibilities, but nonetheless has Cabinet-level 
status.  




66 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 37. 
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up a new draft constitution embodying three principles: retention of 
the emperor system as the symbol of the nation, but not as a sovereign 
power; abolition of the nobility; and renunciation of war.68 
MacArthur’s instruction concerning the renunciation of war 
was broad, seemingly encompassing even self-defense:  
 
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. 
Japan renounces it as an instrument for settling its 
disputes and even for preserving its own security.  It 
relies upon the higher ideals which are not stirring the 
world for its defense and its protection.  No Japanese 
Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and 
no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon 
any Japanese force.69 
 
This instruction would become the basis for Article 9 and the 
generally pacifist nature of the 1947 Constitution in its 
entirety.  
 
B. The Emperor and Origins of Article 9: A Case for Japanese 
Agency 
 
As explained above, one can frequently find asserted—on 
both sides of the Pacific—that General MacArthur and the U.S.-led 
Occupation imposed the 1947 Constitution, with its pacifist character 
as embodied by Article 9, on the Japanese nation. 70   While 
MacArthur’s role in the Constitution’s formation and ultimate 
                                                                                                               
68 AUER, supra note 59, at 70; KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 37; HERZOG, supra note 53, 
at 219.  For a comprehensive account of the American appropriation of the constitutional 
project, see RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING 
THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR 81–96 (2002). 
69  Douglas MacArthur, Three Basic Points Stated by Supreme Commander to Be 
“Musts” in Constitutional Revision (Feb. 4, 1946), http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/
shiryo/03/072/072tx.html#t002.  Part of MacArthur’s original instructions for the anti-war 
clause later appeared in adapted form in the 1947 Constitution’s Preamble.  Compare 
MacArthur’s instructions (“It relies upon the higher ideals which are not stirring the world 
for its defense and its protection”) with the 1947 Constitution’s Preamble (“We, the Japanese 
people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling 
human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting 
in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.”).  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ (日
本国憲法) [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan); HERZOG, supra note 53, at 219. 
70 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28. 
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enactment was certainly significant, it is an oversimplification to 
assert that he arbitrarily imposed a foreign constitution on a feeble 
post-war Japan solely for U.S. benefit. 71   MacArthur’s ultimate 
position in favor of maintaining the Japanese monarchy and its 
monarch was one simultaneously shared with, and highly influenced 
by, the Japanese government and an overwhelming majority of the 
Japanese people.72  
Among the Allied Powers, prominent voices demanded the 
abolition of the Japanese monarchy, including Soviet leader Joseph 
Stalin and Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan of the Republic 
of China (ROC) and son of ROC founder Sun Yat-sen.73  Prior to 
Japan’s formal surrender, the Allies had explicitly rejected an offer 
from Japan that would have protected the sovereign right of the 
Emperor. 74   For the Allies, Japan’s “unconditional surrender” 
brought everything up for grabs, including the imperial throne. 75  
Beyond the issue of the monarchy as an institution, some in the U.S. 
government—high-ranking members of the War and Navy 
departments, and members of Congress, among them—wanted to go 




                                                                                                               
71 Id. 
72 Id.  According to Feldman, “localized self-interest” is the key to creating a powerful 
and durable mode of governance through the process of imposed constitutionalism.  
FELDMAN, supra note 4, at 886.  (“[W]here the international community or the occupier lacks 
the will or capacity for sustained transformation of constitutional norms over time, it would 
be mistaken to impose norms that are perceived by local political actors as antithetical to 
their interests.  This is especially true when the imposed norms are understood locally to 
contradict important symbolic features of the constitutional order.”)  Id. at 887–88.  
MacArthur understood the widespread Japanese interest in maintaining the monarchy as an 
“important symbolic feature” of the constitutional structure and catered to it as a means to 
accomplish the goals of the Occupation, including the promulgation of a new constitution.  
73 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 28, 96.  For a summary of the fall 1945 debate that took 
place in Washington over the future role of the Japanese monarchy, see KATAOKA, supra 
note 56, at 23 (expounding on the role of Japan’s monarchy). 
74 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 17–18; MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 2. 
75 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 2–3. 
76  For example, on September 25, 1945, Democratic Senator Richard Russell of 
Georgia introduced a joint resolution in Congress declaring that it was “the policy of the 
United States that Emperor Hirohito [of Japan] be tried as a war criminal.”  The resolution 
was debated, but never passed.  KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR’S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A 
LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL STUDY OF ITS MAKING 161 (1991); MOORE & ROBINSON, supra 
note 68, at 36. 
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MacArthur came to reject such extreme measures and fought 
strenuously to protect the monarchy and its Emperor. 77   From a 
practical standpoint, he viewed the Emperor as a valuable instrument 
of governance, allowing Occupation directives to be indirectly 
implemented through the Imperial Japanese Government. 78  
Moreover, MacArthur himself came to respect the Emperor.79  After 
all, the Emperor successfully ordered the surrender of the Japanese 
military and naval forces in August 1945 and stopped the war, 
renounced his divinity in January 1946, and became an official 
sponsor of the democratic constitution written predominantly by 
MacArthur’s staff.80  MacArthur regularly gave public praise to the 
Emperor’s actions, further strengthening the post-war status of the 
monarchy.81 
However, while MacArthur began his mission in Japan with 
an inclination towards retaining the Emperor as a means to 
accomplish Occupation goals,82 his ultimate position in favor of the 
Emperor came about in no small part due to a concerted lobbying 
effort led by the Emperor’s own staff.83  These Japanese government 
insiders were well aware of the American public’s perception of the 
Emperor as a complicit actor in the Japanese war effort, and therefore 
deserving of trial and punishment—a view they feared would 
influence MacArthur’s policies.84  At the same time, the Japanese 
insiders were aware and took advantage of MacArthur own unofficial 
Occupation goal: to advance Christianity in Japan.85  
MacArthur was a pious Christian who believed that 
democracy could only exist with a Christian foundation to support 
                                                                                                               
77 For a summary of developments in U.S. policy towards the Japanese emperor and 
MacArthur’s constitutional reforms of the Japanese monarchy, see INOUE, supra note 76, at 
160-220 (describing the development of the Articles of the Constitution). 
78 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 2. 
79 INOUE, supra note 76, at 219. 
80 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 11.  The exact origins of the Emperor’s “Declaration of 
Humanity,” issued on January 1, 1946, are unclear, though MacArthur and his staff were 
involved. MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 68, at 46. 
81 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 17. 
82 In July 1945, MacArthur told his chief of staff that he favored “maximum utilization 
of the existing Japanese governmental agencies and organization” as “premature dislocation 
of governmental machinery would be undesirable.”  Doubtless, removal of the Emperor 
would have been a significant dislocation.  MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 68, at 38. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 39. 
85 Id. at 38. 
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it.86  In preparation for the Occupation’s democratization project, he 
and his staff authorized priority entrance of foreign Christian 
missionaries to Japan, ahead of any other foreign group; provided 
logistical support to those missionaries groups on the ground; 
supported the establishment of a new international Christian 
university in Tokyo; and openly encouraged the Japanese citizenry to 
embrace Christianity.87  
With MacArthur’s views on the intersection of religion and 
government in mind, the insiders engaged in a deliberate and 
organized campaign to persuade MacArthur that the Emperor was not 
only innocent of war crimes, but was himself a victim of the 
militarists who had led the Japanese nation into war.  They also 
insisted that the Emperor was a pacifist deeply influenced by 
Christianity, would cooperate with MacArthur to turn Japan into a 
Christian-based democracy, and that in fact the Emperor’s 
cooperation was the most efficient and effective means to accomplish 
the basic American goal of Japanese democratization.88  As part of 
their effort, the insiders enlisted the support and lobbying efforts of 
both Japanese Christians and American missionaries.89  The insiders 
knew that MacArthur’s geostrategic constitutionalism was premised 
on Christianity—a belief that without the Christian faith, democracy 
could not flourish.90  By recognizing and effectively working within 
MacArthur’s conceptual framework of faith and constitutionalism, 
the Japanese engaged in constitutionalism of their own.  The Japanese 
geostrategic advantage was in accommodating, at least in appearance, 
MacArthur’s own geostrategic vision.  To them, MacArthur’s vision 
offered the surest path to maintaining their imperially oriented 
national structure and regaining their full sovereignty. 
In the end, the Japanese insiders won, and MacArthur was 
sold.  He would later advise the Japanese government on the best way 
to achieve its primary objective in constitutional reform—protection 
of the monarchy—and warned them about the difficulties to 
achieving its objective if appropriate action was not taken. 91   As 
                                                                                                               
86 Id. at 45. 
87 Id. at 44–45.  As of December 1945, SCAP guidelines spelled out that “It is the policy 
of this theater to increase greatly the Christian influence and every effort will be made here 
to absorb missionaries as rapidly as the church can send them into the area.”  Id. at 44. 
88 Id. at 38–39. 
89 Id. at 39–44. 
90 Id. at 44. 
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General Whitney would tell the Japanese when presenting the SCAP 
draft: “[T]he acceptance of the provisions of this new Constitution 
would render the Emperor practically unassailable.”92 
Unsurprisingly, MacArthur’s goal to preserve the institution 
of the monarchy was widely accepted both within the Japanese 
government and throughout Japanese society.  The governing Liberal 
and Progressive Parties had been elected on platforms advocating for 
the preservation of the “national polity,” the central tenet of which 
was the idea that the Emperor ruled by divine right.93  During the 
deliberations over the new constitution, Kanamori Tokujiro, the 
cabinet minister then in charge of constitutional revision, proclaimed 
to the Diet that MacArthur’s constitution would not alter the national 
polity, but in fact would preserve it.94  Suzuki Kantaro, who had been 
prime minister at the time of the decision to surrender to the Allied 
Powers, also emphasized that the proposed constitution would 
preserve the national structure, with the Emperor at its symbolic 
center.95  In essence, the Japanese accepted the 1947 Constitution in 
exchange for the preservation of their imperial system, engaging in 
nothing short of classic geostrategic constitutionalism.96  Key to the 
exchange was Article 9. 
The origin of MacArthur’s idea to explicitly constitutionalize 
pacifism and renunciation of war remains somewhat disputed, 
although MacArthur claimed later in his career that Prime Minister 
Shidehara had proposed the idea to him.97  According to MacArthur, 
during a two-and-a-half hour talk on January 24, 1946, Shidehara 
proposed that “when the new constitution became final . . . it [should] 
include the so-called no-war clause.  He also wanted it to prohibit any 
military establishment for Japan—any military establishment 
                                                                                                               
92 Id. at 12. 
93 Id. at 18. 
94 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 18.  Ironically, in making such public proclamations, 
Kanamori in fact jeopardized the new constitution and its maintenance of the imperial system.  
At meetings with Kanamori on July 17 and 23, 1946, Colonel Kades — who worked on 
General Whitney’s staff — complained that statements that the new constitution would not 
alter the national structure were undermining the efforts of MacArthur to preserve the 
monarchy.  As Kades emphasized, MacArthur had to defend the new constitution to the 
Allied Powers, who were extremely critical of the monarchy, and the Japanese were making 
it very difficult for MacArthur to do this.  Id. at 18–19. 
95 Id. at 12. 
96 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 36. 
97 HERZOG, supra note 53, at 219. 
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whatsoever.” 98   MacArthur’s account has since received 
corroboration from renowned Japanese law professor Takayanagi 
Kenzo, who chaired of the committee that investigated the formation 
of the Constitution from 1957 to 1964. 99   Takayanagi originally 
believed that MacArthur had authored and forcibly imposed Article 
9 on the Japanese government. 100   Following his committee’s 
investigation, however, Takayanagi concluded that:  
 
Article 9 had its origins in Tokyo, not in 
Washington. . . . Shidehara astonished the General 
with a proposal for the insertion of renunciation-of-
war and disarmament clause into the new Constitution.  
Apparently the General hesitated at first because of 
the possible deleterious effects on United States 
foreign policy in East Asia. . . . The Prime Minister, 
however, succeeded in persuading the General that in 
the Atomic Age the survival of mankind should 
precede all national strategies.101  
 
Despite its origins, however, “Shidehara behaved as if Article 9 were 
proposed by MacArthur, although he never clearly said so.  If he had 
said the proposal was his idea, not MacArthur’s, it might have been 
rejected by the Cabinet.  Shidehara was diplomatic enough to know 
this.”102 
According to Shidehara’s secretary, Shidehara had indeed 
suggested that Japan should renounce war in the future as a matter of 
policy, but the idea to explicitly codify the policy in the 1947 
Constitution came directly from MacArthur.  On this account, 
Shidehara was shocked to find it codified in the draft constitution.103  
Other sources claim the idea originated with MacArthur.  
Frank Rizzo, who succeeded General Whitney as head of the 
Government Section, asserted that General MacArthur “undoubtedly 
authored the war renunciation clause.”104  The personal notes of an 
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100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 71–72. 
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104 Id. at 219. 
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officer on General Whitney’s staff likewise claim that General 
MacArthur was the originator of Article 9.105  Under this view, the 
most likely inspiration for MacArthur’s renunciation of war 
requirement to the new constitution was the 1935 constitution of the 
Philippines.106   
Yet regardless of the actual origins of Article 9, the Japanese 
government later explained the constitutionalization of the 
renunciation of war to the Diet as an absolute requirement from 
SCAP—and importantly, as an absolute requirement to preserve the 
monarchy.  Prime Minister Yoshida, who succeeded Shidehara in 
May 1946, stated publicly that he agreed with constitutionalizing the 
renunciation of war in order to quell fears of the reemergence of 
Japanese militarism. 107   In other words, like their predecessors 
developing the Meiji Constitution, the Japanese government used a 
constitutional project to protect their national structure from the threat 
of dissolution and amplify their national power in the face of 
substantial foreign authority over their affairs.  As MacArthur and his 
American staff was developing U.S. geostrategic constitutionalism, 
the Japanese cooperated as a means to assert their own.  The Japanese 
course of action was not coercion or imposition, but rather calculation 
and choice. 
These calculations would continue throughout the 
deliberation and amendment process prior to the Constitution’s 
promulgation, as the Japanese molded the final document into a 





                                                                                                               
105 Id. at 220. 
106 KATAOKA, supra note 56, at 37.  In 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-
McDuffie Act, authorizing the Philippine legislature to convene a constitutional convention 
and draft a constitution in preparation for the colony’s independence.  Article II, Section 2, 
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution read: “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument 
of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part 
of the law of the Nation.”  Id.  Other accounts contend that the idea originated from within 
Government Section, as staff took inspired from the pre-war Kellogg-Briand Pact.  See 
MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 5–6. 
107 HERZOG, supra note 53, at 220.  Through 1952, Yoshida continued to insist that 
Article 9 applied to offensive war potential, stating publicly that rearmament would require 
a revision of the Constitution.  On the other hand, Yoshida distinguished “defense potential,” 
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C. Debate and Adoption: The Post-War Constitution’s 
Promulgation 
 
After receiving MacArthur’s orders, SCAP’s Government 
Section prepared its draft constitution in six days and submitted it to 
the Japanese government on February 13.108  Article 8 of the SCAP 
draft—which would later become Article 9—stated: “War as a 
sovereign right of the nation is abolished.  The threat or use of force 
is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations.  
No army, navy, air force or other war potential will ever by authorized 
and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the state.”109  
Even with the deletion of the words “even for preserving its own 
security,” the Shidehara Cabinet reacted to the clause with shock.110  
However, Shidehara told his Cabinet that this new Constitution—and 
the renunciation of war clause, in particular—would set the monarchy 
on a more solid foundation.111  With this in mind, the clause remained.  
In fact, the Emperor’s direct role in the formal 
implementation of Article 9 should not be overlooked.  MacArthur 
viewed legal continuity with the Meiji Constitution as “necessary to 
prevent subsequent invalidation of the constitution.”112  This would 
require the Emperor’s cooperation and formal participation: “Article 
73 of the Meiji Constitution required that in amending the 
constitution, the Emperor assume ‘the initiative right’ and that the 
amendment project be submitted to the Diet by ‘imperial order.’”113  
Aware of his direct role in the implementation of the 
provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, on June 20, 1946, the 
Emperor formally initiated constitutional change by submitting the 
imperial project of amendment of the Meiji Constitution to the 
                                                                                                               
108 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 40; Auer, supra note 59, at 71.  For a copy of the SCAP 
draft of the Constitution, see Memorandum from the Steering Comm. et al. to the Chief of 
the Gov’t Section of the Pub. Admin. Div. (Feb. 12, 1946), http://www.ndl.go.jp/
constitution/e/shiryo/03/076a_e/076a_etx.html#t005 (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (providing 
the draft version that removed a provision that no amendment in the future could constrain 
or eliminate the rights, which the new Constitution of Japan may guarantee). 
109 Auer, supra note 59, at 71. 
110 Id. 
111 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 12.  See also MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 68, at 
112–14 (explaining how MacArthur convinced Shidehara that the renunciation of war clause 
promoted Japan’s best interest to re-establish amicable relationships with other countries). 
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Diet.114  The imperial message referred to the elimination of obstacles 
to democratic government and affirmed the vision of a constitution 
representing the freely expressed will of the people.115 
The SCAP draft constitution was submitted to the Diet’s 
House of Representatives, which formed a 72-member Constitutional 
Amendment Committee (CAC) to propose revisions.116  However, it 
was understood that any changes to the draft required the concurrence 
of SCAP headquarters.117  The CAC commented on the SCAP draft 
and made select changes, but attempts to significantly modify the 
draft were countered by American threats towards the status of the 
Emperor and threats to take the draft directly to the Japanese people 
for a popular election.118  The Japanese government believed that if 
the SCAP draft were presented to the Japanese people alongside the 
Matsumoto draft, the SCAP draft would be overwhelmingly 
approved, and so the government understood that its role was to 
acquiesce to the new Constitution and its reconceptualization of the 
Japanese state.119  
The CAC eventually proposed two amendments concerning 
Article 9: the words “aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order” were added to the beginning of the first 
sentence; and the words “in order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph” were added to the beginning of the second 
sentence.120  When the amendments were brought to the attention of 
Government Section, no objections were made.121 
At the time, the public explanation for the additions was that 
they would more sincerely indicate Japan’s wish for peace—however, 
just a few years later, Ashida Hitoshi, who had chaired the CAC, 
                                                                                                               
114 Id. at 16. 
115 Id. at 15. 
116 Id. at 16–17; Auer, supra note 59, at 73. 
117 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 16. 
118 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 40. 
119 Id. 
120 Auer, supra note 59, at 73. 
121 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 21.  In fact, according to historian Sato Tatsuo, the 
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announced that the amendments to Article 9 had been written 
specifically to permit rearmament for the purpose of self-defense.122   
Ashida’s claim directly conflicted with the objectives of the 
Occupation, which included Japan’s perpetual demilitarization as a 
primary goal.  From the Occupation’s perspective, a complete 
prohibition of armed forces would seem the most effective means of 
preventing the reappearance of militarism. 123   Nonetheless, 
MacArthur’s staff seemed to have been aware of the interpretive 
changes introduced by the CAC amendments and nonetheless 
acquiesced.  When Dr. Cyrus Peake, a Government Section officer, 
pointed out to General Whitney that the CAC’s textual modifications 
would permit Japan to maintain defense forces, Whitney agreed that 
this change was “acceptable.”124  
Throughout the Diet deliberations, Prime Minister Yoshida 
repeatedly clarified the enactment of the new democratic constitution 
would fulfill a basic precondition for the withdrawal of the 
Occupation forces: the establishment of a democratic form of 
government, as provided in paragraph 12 of the Potsdam 
Declaration. 125   Interestingly, Yoshida’s argument for adopting 
SCAP’s draft constitution mirrored the arguments motivating 
Japanese leadership of the 1880s to create the Meiji Constitution.  In 
both the late 1880s and late 1940s, Japan found itself under the thumb 
of foreign power, and in each instance Japanese leaders viewed 
constitutionalism as an avenue of escape and renewed vitality.  In 
neither period was constitutionalism imposed on Japan; rather, both 
cases demonstrate Japan choosing constitutionalism as a means to 
achieve geostrategic advantage.  The constitutionalism of 1940s 
Japan began with surrender to the Allied Powers and acceptance of 
the Occupation on Japanese soil, and was managed with a view 
towards reassuming the position of a sovereign and self-governing 
nation.  In short, like their American occupiers, the Japanese actively 
engaged in geostrategic constitutionalism. 
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123 HERZOG, supra note 53, at 220. 
124 MCNELLY, supra note 52, at 21.  In fact, despite early policies suggesting permanent 
disarmament, the American government directive known as SWNCC 228 stated that the 
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The new constitution—drafted by the Occupation, with select 
approved modifications made by the CAC—was promulgated by the 
Emperor on November 3, 1946, in line with the procedure for 
constitutional amendment set out by the Meiji Constitution.126  
The 1947 Constitution’s Preamble sets a pacifist tone that 
glosses the entire document.  From its opening sentence, the 
denouncement of militarism and aggression that motivated the 
constitution’s drafters becomes evident, as “We, the Japanese people” 
declare themselves “determined that we shall secure for ourselves and 
our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and 
the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never 
again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action 
of government.”127   To forever prevent the “horrors of war” and 
secure “the fruits of peaceful cooperation”—to effectuate the 
Preamble’s ambition and promise, both for the U.S. and Japanese 
nations who had fought the bitter war in the ironically named 
Pacific—the 1947 Constitution codifies its renunciation of war in the 
words of the constitutional text itself:  
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever 
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes.  In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well 
as other war potential, will never be maintained.  The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.128  
 
This was the promise of the 1947 Constitution, a promise directed 
towards the Americans and Japanese alike. 129   Indeed, it was a 
promise directed towards the world. 
 
 
                                                                                                               
126 GOODMAN, supra note 48, at 40.  Coincidentally, November 3 also happened to be 
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128 Id. at art. 9. 
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Leading Japanese politicians today continue to challenge the 
legitimacy of the 1947 Constitution, arguing that its structure and 
substance are designed to keep Japan perpetually weak.130  Some 
conservative Japanese scholars have even gone so far as to refer to 
Japan’s acceptance of SCAP’s draft constitution as the nation’s 
“second surrender.”131   
Superficially, this line of reasoning has some truth to it.  
Article 9 was indeed considered a crucial element to the goals of the 
victorious Americans, who did not want the specter of a future war in 
the Pacific hanging over their heads.132  MacArthur’s revision of the 
Japanese constitution, therefore, can be understood as an effort to 
enforce the principal objective of U.S. Occupation policy: to prevent 
Japan from ever again endangering U.S. national security.133  In fact, 
MacArthur himself came to view the Japanese Occupation as his 
greatest military achievement. 134   This was U.S. geostrategic 
constitutionalism at its apex.   
Yet to contend that the 1947 Constitution was manifestly an 
imposed instrument of government undersells at best, and overlooks 
entirely at worst, the agency of Japanese actors and the consideration 
given Japanese interests in the constitution’s development, 
ratification, and ultimate promulgation.135  The constitutional debates 
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overlook the fact that the constitution which the 1947 Constitution replaced—the Meiji 
Constitution—was itself largely of foreign origin and imposition, albeit less directly.   Law, 
supra note 3, at 264. 
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within the Japanese political community in 1946 were not hasty or 
shallow, or subservient to Occupation pressures.136  To contend that 
the 1947 Constitution—or, even more narrowly, Article 9—was 
imposed on a helpless Japan ignores the intelligent and well-informed 
Japanese who seized the moment to lay a new foundation for their 
nation in the post-war world.137  The Japanese weighed their interests 
and made a series of calculated decisions to protect them.  In 
particular, Japanese leadership exercised its own brand of 
geostrategic constitutionalism.  These leaders chose surrender and 
cooperation with the Allied Powers in order to protect their monarchy 
and their national sovereignty in the long run.  Like the Meiji 
Constitution of the late nineteenth century, constitutionalism came to 
be viewed by the Japanese as a means to reach a geostrategic end: the 
national vitality of the Japanese state.   
More tellingly, despite mechanisms available in the 1947 
Constitution to formally amend the document—or even excise 
Article 9 in its entirety—Japan has never undertaken to do so.  Quite 
to the contrary, the 1947 Constitution has never been formally 
amended. 138   “[F]ew if any, alien documents have ever been as 
thoroughly internalized and vigorously defended as this [Japanese] 
national charter would come to be [by the Japanese public].” 139  
Moreover, this vigorous defense of the constitution as ratified did not 
take long to foment: shortly after the proposed constitution became 
public in 1946, public opinion polls revealed strong and immediate 
support for the constitution’s foundational precepts, including eighty-
five percent of respondents favoring retention of the Emperor in a 
reduced role, and seventy-two percent characterizing Article 9 as 
necessary.140 
However, since the 1947 Constitution’s enactment, Japanese 
governments have regularly “reinterpreted” its provisions to suit 
changing national security needs.  As recently as July 1, 2014, Japan’s 
current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, “reinterpreted” Article 9 to 
permit Japan’s Self-Defense Force (SDF), the country’s pseudo-
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military, to play a more assertive role in East Asian affairs.141  Rather 
than being confined to a merely defensive role, the reinterpretation 
would allow the SDF to aid “friendly countries under attack” under a 
theory of collective self-defense.142  Even a decade ago, such use of 
force by the SDF would have been unthinkable.143 
While the reinterpretations of Article 9 in which Abe and his 
predecessors have engaged might be seen as adventurous when 
compared to the clause’s text and intent, they have a check: the vote.  
Japan’s present foreign policy is as much determined by the public’s 
attitude towards its own interpretations of Article 9 as by diplomacy 
and national security strategy.144  While the Japanese government’s 
stance has been to arm its country purely for individual self-defense, 
the Japanese people as a whole strongly support the aspiration for 
peace expressed in the 1947 Constitution and embodied in Article 
9.145  Geostrategic constitutionalism lives on. 
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